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1. Introduction 
The Russian nation-state came into existence in 1991 as legal heir to a fOlmer superpower. 
A countIy with vast resources, great geopolitical scope, a multiple ethnic make-up, and a 
turbulent histoI}', Russia faces fundamental challenges in the coming years. Amongst these 
challenges is its search for an identity, a search which will have decisive influence on its 
neighbour, the European Union, but also the other players in the international system. This 
difficult process takes place in an era when the rebirth of nationalism and ethnicity is the 
central and frequently destabilising factor of most countries in transition. 
In such a time the questions of how the new Russia will be able to feel secure enough 
without overpowering its immediate neighbours to the south and the west; and how 
national interests are being defined within the complex state structure, given a society 
which is traumatised by the after-effects of shock therapy, tom between nostalgia and 
pragmatism, need to be squarely addressed. 
2. Constructing 'Russian identity' in the mirror of Europe: Setting, concepts, problems 
The fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire present Russia with a 
number of intractable economic, social, and political problems, but primarily with the 
necessity of nation-building which entails the establishment of its own cultural and 
political identity within the recognised borders of the Russian Federation. 
Russian national identity or the 'national idea' of Russia is seen often as a 'set of 
visualisations of the national past and the national future' against a set of specific 
contextual factors, and it appears that 'the national ideal of a new democratic Russia must 
be phrased with a question mark' (Stankevich, 1994:24). When Alexei Arbatov vocalised 
this question mark by exclaiming, "but what about Russian interests? Why are they like an 
open box? Why is there no precise formulation of our interests? What are Russia's 
priorities? ... " (in International Affairs, 1994:21), he referred directly to the fluidity and the 
shapelessness of Russian identity in relation to the Other(s). 
The present multifaceted reflection of what Russia and Russianness are; what the 
'political community with which the citizens of the new state are supposed to identify' 
(Barber, 1994:48) is; what values and aspirations it embodies; how it perceives the world 
and is perceived by the world; all of these present crucial and topical questions for students 
of politics and international relations. Here it is worth emphasising that our basic approach 
is informed by an interest in international relations and the reflexive dimensions of 
interactive political structures and histories. Thus, we are interested in Russia in light of the 
5 
dynamics of 'inter-' and 'intra-national' contributions to the representation and 
construction of Europe, inside as well as outside the European Union, rather than as 
'Sovietologists' . 
Is the Rnssian 'V olksgeist' indeed different from that of other nations, and, if so, 
what does it imply in respect of the other actors in the international system? Hence, in this 
section, some of the dimensions pertaining to the problematique of national identity and 
self-definition in Russia will be pursued, primarily in a conceptnalising vein, with 
particular focns on the significance of Europe and the West for the process of recasting 
Russian identity and the vacillations this identity is CWTently undergoing. The presumption 
underlying this undertaking is, as will be argued in detail below, that endogenous Russian 
conceptions of what uniquely constitutes Russianness have, historically as well as today, 
been shaped to a significant degree by images of the non Russian world, particularly its 
'western' part. Hence in addressing Russia' s position the question of what is meant by the 
term 'West' is a fundamental one (see e.g. Malia, 1994). The terms 'Russia and the 
West'l'Russia and Europe' can be traced back to Peter the Great (ibid.:30). In this article, 
the term 'Europe' involves the European Union as a basic parameter for analysis, while the 
reference to 'the West' encompasses the Atlantic element in addition to the dimension of 
'Europe'. 
For an initial diagnosis, the problem in defining national identity in Russia is not that 
there is no 'Russian idea', but that there are many, and that this national idea has, for more 
than 70 years, been out of sync with the realities of Soviet Statehood, a condition where 
Russianness was submerged in and, in important respects, subordinated to a top-down 
construction of a Soviet fatherland of peasants and workers. In this sense, 'Russian 
identity' had come to be a rather abstract, discursivised notion with little concrete 
substance. 
Second, Russia, as heir to the former USSR, was built on the demolition of a 
political-economic system, the defeat in the Cold War, and the concomitant creation of a 
social cri,sis in addition to an identity vacuum; in this sense there was little political or 
culturaIlegacy for example in the field offoreign politics to be constructively used for the 
building of a new identity. Perestroika and New Political Thinking failed to formulate a 
politics of nationality and changed the relationship of the NIS towards Moscow and the 
Russian Diaspora. Furthermore, Gorbachev's per se rational decision to deconstruct the 
Communist ideology, from above, in the process changing the life of all citizens and civic 
culture, has created a conundrum of powerful cultural, ethnic, and national movements 
injecting volatility into the definition of Russian identity, both in the domestic and in the 
international sense. 
On the one hand, this cluster of issues and the legacy of a traumatic past caused a 
flight from ideology towards a more pragmatic definition of national interests in the new 
Russian state (Malcolm, 1994). As Kozyrev proclaimed in 1994, ' so let us introduce a 
measure of pragmatism into all this with due regard to Russian interests' (in International 
Affairs, 1994: 14). In the foreign policy area, it initially appeared that Russia had finally 
transformed into one state shaped by national interests rather than by a dominant national 
ideology (Aron, 1994: 18). On the other, it has tended to reactivate old Russian ambignities 
vis-a-vis Europe and the West (Neumann, 1995), and has created problems of self-image 
and self-definition caught between superpower confidence and the inferiority complex of a 
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nation-state perceiving itself as an outcast from civilised society, and consequently 
between opting for an autonomous and traditionally nationalistic policy trajectory and a 
path of integration and interdependence as regards the international community (the 
oscillation in part being made possible by weak institutional links between Russia and the 
West). 
In the following, these two models of political identityl construction will be referred 
to as the endogenous and the exogenous, respectively. In the first mode, the role of the 
Other tends towards being that of a contrast, even enemy, whereas in the second, the Other 
is a partner, the positive extension of self-identity. 
The problems of forging an official Russian identity and their relevance for the 
question of European security demarcations and the definition of Europe's borders are well 
encapsulated in the following two quotes, the first an inside view of Russian problems 
from the vantage-point of a centrally situated Russian politician, the second the recording 
and assessment of them by an experienced western observer of European and international 
affairs: 
'Starting with Michael Gorbachev's perestroika, most Russian leaders and most of 
the population have been convinced that [ ... J Russia would be successfully integrated 
into the community of civilised countries united by the "West" concept, and that this 
would bring economic and political advantages and strengthen security. [ ... J 
However, all these hopes have proved to be vain illusions. Russia is not regarded as 
even a potential member of effective Western integration structures (EU, NATO), 
and the "common European home" has remained on the drawing board. 
Economically, Russia has moved even further away from the West than the USSR if 
we take the absolute figures for foreign economic aid [ ... J No progress is being made 
in creating a new security system which would replace the two-bloc system and in 
which Russia felt relatively comfortable. For some time Russia will have to live with 
a minimum of allies. From the point of view of domestic political arrangements, this 
plays into the hands of the nationalists rather than favouring the supporters of the 
Western integrationist line' .2 
A diagnosis echoed from the outside by journalist William Pfaff in a commentary in the 
International Herald Tribune, 3 April 1995, entitled 'Volatile, Vulnerable In-Between 
Russia': 
Talk with some of the younger intellectnaIs and politicians of Russia and you 
discover acute sensitivity as to how they are seen in the West and are treated by 
Westerners. The issue is important to them because if Russia's civilisation is separate 
from that of the West, then some of its historical catastrophes and some of its 
present-day anomalies are easier to rationalise. An old and harmless version of this 
idea of Russia as not like other countries is the contention that Russians are 
"spiritnaI" and wise, while Westerners are crass and shallow materialists. The 
dangerous version of the argument is the one which says to the Westerner: "You 
tlllnk we are not Westerners, unfit to be you partners, that we are backward and 
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"Asian"? Fine. That's just what we will be and how we will behave, and once more 
we will make you feel as sorry as you were during the seven decades that lead up to 
glasnost''' . 
Both of these quotes shed light on the fact that the question of Russian identity (at least in 
its political dimension - see below) can hardly be separated from that of Russia's role in 
the world, its recognition by other players in the international system, and also its 
embeddedness in European culture and politics. 
******** 
More than in many other countries, Russianness (as a distorted reflection and manifestation 
of both pre-1917 Tsarist ambitions as well as of co=unist internationalism) is inscribed 
into histOlY and its ambiguities as regards friendly or defiant relations with the West 
Russianness, within the boundaries of a cultural-linguistic legacy, has been defined in 
different ways throughout the history of the Russian nation. Even during Co=unism, 
Russianness was based on the old Russian messianic idea of Orthodox Christianity. As 
Berdyaev argues: 
'The religious fonnation of the Russian spirit developed several stable attitudes: 
dogmatism, asceticism, the ability to endure suffering and to make sacrifices for the 
sake of its faith whatever that may be, a reaching to the transcendental, to the other 
world, now to the future, to this world. The religious energy of the Russian spirit 
possesses the faculty of switching over and directing itself to pmposes that are not 
merely religious, for example, to social objects' (1960:9). 
On this premise, it can be argued that on the one hand the USSR, during the seven decades 
following the 1917 upheaval, consistently promoted the myth of its central role as a 
champion of internationalism in world politics, and in this sense latched on to the pro-
European politics dating back to Peter the Great. On the other, Catherine the Great, whilst 
also cultivating the ideas of the Enlightenment and of Voltaire, simultaneously symbolises 
another strand: the championing of a centralised state to protect the Russian empire 
(Kappeler, 1993). The attendant establishment of a state ideology of Russia, as a factor of 
imperial expansion, initially introduced the question that the Russians are still asking 
themselves today, who they were within the multinational state that they were living in. 
Following Neil Malcolm, Russian political culture thus appears as a peculiar hybrid: 
'(w)hen Stalin adopted the policy of "socialism in one country" he opened the way to a 
fusing of traditional Russian authoritarianism with Bolshevik contempt for "parliamentary 
cretinism"; traditional Russian dislike for commerce with Marxian revulsion against capita-
lism; traditional Russian xenophobia with Leninist apprehension about the intentions of 
imperialism' (1994:7). 
Such deeply ingrained ambiguities of Soviet identity find their logical extension in 
present-day Russian identity problems with an extra twist of the screw. During 
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Communism, for ideological reasons, the Russian-centred state intentionally did not 
attempt to create a Russian imperial identity (akin to e.g. 'universal' Frenchness), but 
championed Marxism-Leninism as not only an all-encompassing identity for all the 
peoples and nations living within the compass of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, 
but in important respects actually favoured the republics (for instance, all other provinces 
but Russia had a recognised capital). In this sense, Russian identity prior to 1989 was 
Willed by the absence of official recognition and symbolic IIlllIkers - and conceivably by 
the erosion of cultural-historical notions as well. Russia, the USSR, and the concept of 
'fatherland' merged, at least in official discourse, and possibly also for a sizeable chunk of 
the Russian population. 
This presents contempoI3l)' Russia with a considerable task of identity 
reconstruction, resulting in political and ideological struggles about how, when, and why to 
forge a Rnssianness; who the central protagonists of this project are; and what the role of 
the outside world ought to be: friendly gradualist mirror; contrastive enemy image; or 
exotic repository of cultural Europeanness (Hedetoft, 1995). As a consequence, the 
'declassed' Russian presently suffers from a lack of orientation; Ignatov refers to a 'mental 
orphanage of this Russian citizenry' (1992:42) (see also Lester: 1995:57). Levada points 
out that this loss of orientation, following the implosion of ideology, now impedes the 
adaptation to new realities by a people that has traditionally looked for collective mental 
coordination and guidance, but now has to learn to 'think for themselves' (1992). The 
expectation by the incumbents and loci of power of the Russian state (which essentially 
remained unchanged), that a civil society would develop from its own means, that it could 
be constructed according to reforming demands, and hence provide the legitimacy for the 
state as a development of state ('national') interests, was sorely disappointed. The civil 
society engendered fundamental social political and ideological changes (Lester, 1995), 
creating its own dynamic, increasing the gap between the institutions of power and society 
at large. 
As regards the ethnic complexities of the Russian state, the construction of a distinct 
and viable Russian identity based on civic values, becomes even more difficult. Olsanskij 
argues that 'if ethnicity is based on national ethnic self-confidence, then the Russians have 
ceased to exist' (1992). 
For this reason, Yeltsin's, Gaidar's and others' reformulation of the ideas of the 
Russian 'we', following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, now attempts to integrate 
the notion of civic values, and has often stressed the 'European' legacy of Russian history. 
While the relationship to the West appears to be fluid and undefined, it remains - so argue 
Yergin and Gustafson - as a 'figure of speech, denoting the community of industrial 
nations that are attached to democracy and liberal values and that are knitting the world 
together into the global village' (Yergin and Gustafson, 1995:287). The ultimate goal is 
and will always be to join 'civilisation', a code word appearing in the rhetoric of politicians, 
public figures, and the academic community. This term also connotes the Russians' 
struggle to reject and escape the totalitarian path, and their ambition to adapt to the ways of 
liberal countries and the standard of living that goes with it (ibid). The question whether 
this is a development which originated from the new foci of power within the state 
machinery, remains, however, open. 
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On the other hand, the more introvert, autonomous representations of Russianness 
(Communists as well as nationalists) attempts to recast Russian identity in its 
(reconstructed) ethnic, essentialist (sometimes religious) dimensions, 'the West' being used 
as the reference point of contrastive Otherness. 
Reverting to the histol)' of the Russian nation, we find another example of the two 
alternatives of a cosmopolitan state versus the authoritarian and orthodox model, in the 
shape of the cities of Novgorod and Moscow. While the Muscovite ideology stated that 
'the Russian prince was not to be a philosopher but the guardian of tradition' (Billington, 
1970:55), the political and cultural foundations of Novgorod rested on the principles of 
cosmopolitanism, representative government, and philosophical rationalism. Novgorod's 
participation in the Hanseatic league, its vigorous trade relations with Emope, its advanced 
monetal)' system, and its high rate of literacy was continuously assanIted by Moscow: 'in 
many ways, the first internal conflict between Eastward and Westward looking Russia, 
foreshadowing what was later to develop between Moscow and St. Petersbmg' (Billington, 
1970:80). 
While today 'Novgorod' encapsulates the Russian attempt at constructing an 
indigenous 'Verfassungspatriotismus' through the political interpretation and dissemination 
of national identity, 'Moscow' (ironically in the mould of the inherently Emopean, 
objective romanticism of nation-states: states spring from the soil of national ethnies!) tries 
to construct a nationalism committing the state and the objectives of the Russian polity to 
atavistic formulations of national sentiments and suspicions about the aims of the (western) 
Other. Along this line of thought, and following Parekh (1995), it could be argued that the 
first version of Russianness wants the state (interests) to forge the nation (identity); the 
second looks to the presmned national identity to forge the state and its formulation of 
Russian interests in the world. The first is (or attempts to be) rational; the second is 
affective. The first stresses international cooperation as a viable route towards Russian 
influence as well as identity; the second is engulfed in historical mythology and sees the 
future of Russia as self-contained and self-reliant. For both main stands, however, (and 
there are compounds of them, witness below), the western world is basically a dual 
concept with volatile meanings and normativities attached to it partly determined by the 
changing contexts of international cooperation or conflict .3 
This implies that in terms of the continuum indicated above - between 'endogenous' 
and 'exogenous' formulations of Russian policies of identity - the following three 
conceptnaI observations/distinctions should be made: 
1. It is (by now) an accepted fact that nationaIism, as one of its core featmes, is 
reflexive (Giddens, 1985; Hedetoil, 1995), i. e. constitutes itself in the mirror that the 
national Other, the international context etc. affords. This is, nonnally, particularly true for 
small-scale nationalisms. It would, however, seem to be extraordinarily pertinent for 
Russian identity constructions as well, historically as well as in light of ongoing debates in 
90s Russia. It is particularly noteworthy in this connection that the distinction between the 
'endogenous' definitions of Russianness (e.g. nationalists of the Zhirinovsky type) and 
those that can be designated 'exogenous' (e.g. internationalists like Gaidar) is not one 
between, on the one hand, people who factually discard the importance of 'the abroad' 
(though they might discmsive1y do so) and, on the other, those who recognise its impor-
tance. Rather, it is a progrannnatic distinction of political ambition on Russia's behalf; as 
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well as one pertaining to distinctive kinds of discourse and desirability as far as Russia's 
role in the world is concerned. However, at both ends of the spectrum, the Other is, 
insidiously or overtly, present as a vehicle of self-definition; sometimes the tables even 
seem to be turned on the discourses one would expect. It is not Wlcommon to encoWlter 
'endogenous' formulations referring to either Russia's proud international past, Russia's 
cultural European legacy, or the significance of the 'near abroad'. Nor is it Wlusual for 
'exogenous' Russian internationalists to e.g. warn the West against endangering Russian 
security (often with reference to the fuel this kind of truly exogenous, post-cold-war 
redefinitious of Russia by the Other could provide the nationalists with), or to symbolise 
Russian independence of action (e.g. Checbnya), or recreate international respect for 
Russia as a sovereign power (e.g. Serbia/Bosnia). In other words, the discursive-symbolic 
positions at either end of a theoretical dualism are heavily modified by the way in which 
both strands define the Russian problem in practical, reflexive terms, often very 
reminiscent of each other, something which indicates that rather than as a dualism, the link 
should properly be envisaged as a continuum between endogenous nationalism ('Endo'), 
via domestic internationalism ('Endo-Exo'), to the exogenous Other (the West and its 
actions, respectively its definitions of Russian identity and intentions, and the way these 
feed into Russian self-perceptions; 'Exo-Exo'): 
Figure 1 
Endo Endo-Exo Exo-Exo 
------------------------------------~I-------------
Far right 
Russophi/e 
Centre Pro-West 
At/anticist 
EuropeIW est 
Foreign Other 
The most interesting point is the line separating the domestic from the foreign arena: it is 
blurred in the case of the domestic internationalists (endo-exo), but rigidly demarcated 
when viewed from the left-hand side of the continuum. At the same time it marks the point 
at which nationalist reflexivity turns critical: where endo- and exo-images of Russianness 
meet and define each other in fluctuating, sometimes circular configurations of mutual 
definition, perception, prejudice, and action. 
2. Debates about the content, direction, and shifting definitions of 'Russianness' can 
productively be imagined (following Hoffinann, 1968) in terms of a 'national triad' 
consisting of 'identity', 'interests', and 'context' : 
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Figure 2: 
Interests 
(rational, sentimental) 
Identity (political, historical, 
civic, ethnic-cultural, religious) 
Context 
(domestic, intemational, historical) 
'Identity' can be pertinently broken down into five major dimensions, i.e. political, 
historical, civic, ethnic-cultural, and religious. 'Interests' can be either rational or 
sentimental (affective). And 'context' can be approached as domestic, historical, or 
international. Relations between the three points of the triangle are naturally volatile, since 
different combinations between varying dimensions are possible, theoretically as well as 
practically, depending on the relative weight accorded to each point (dependent or 
independent variable? Is identity primarily political-civic or historical-ethnic? Does the 
context facilitate a Russian Sonderweg, respectively short-cut, to economic and political 
reconstruction? Should domestic or foreign-policy concerns be given priority? etc.). From 
the vantage-point of ideal-types, however, the poles on the continuum identified so far 
would relate to the triad as follows: 
a Endo (inclines towards the left-hand side of the continuum): Tends to combine 
identity (prioritised concept), as ethnic-historical, with interest formulation based on 
sentiment, and context being primarily domestic, emphasising a maximum of 
historical continuity of Russianness. Identity here subordinates both interest and 
context under it (in that order of importance). As far as the Other is concerned, the 
tendency here will be to use 'the West' as a way of identi1)ring an inimical, 
competitive international environment. 
b. Endo-exo (inclines towards the middle of the continuum): Tends to combine 
interest (prioritised concept), as rational, with context as primarily international, 
emphasising the need to construct a new Russia, and based on an identity concept 
which is political and civic. 'Interests' here subordinates both context and identity 
under it (in that order of importance). Here the Other will typically be identified as 
'Europe', as a notion of culture and civilisation indicating a relatively friendly and 
highly necessary international context. 
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c. Exo-exo (right-hand side of the continuum): Typically proceeds from the perspec-
tive of the international context (often heavily coloured by a sediment of historical 
stereotypes), as viewed through institutional (often 'rational') or national (often 
'affective') interest formulations vis-it-vis Russian identity, which accordingly is seen 
as either prone to moderation and civilisation, or, more often, as potentially 
dangerous, either because of international great-power ambitious, or because of a 
handed-down 'Asian' barbarism. 
It must be stressed both that this represent a model; it is not a precise reflection of Russian 
reality, and also that, contraIy to appearances, 'identity' /'interest' on the one hand, and 
'context' on the other, should not be conceived as 'subjective' and 'objective' categories, 
respectively. In other words, it must be recognised that also 'context' is, to a significant 
extent, a political and subjectivist construction, dependent on interpretation and allocations 
of (degrees of) meaning and consequence. Hence 'context' is not neutral, elevated above 
ongoing struggles, but is deeply implicated in these as a focal point of contestation and 
definition (and, for some, not least large parts of the Russian population, as an area of 
relative ignorance). This is particularly significant as regards the interpretation of current 
changes, intentions, and directions in the international context: The implications of EU and 
NATO expansion eastwards for Russian identity and security; the 'reading of' the western 
position on Chechnya, and the redefinition of this domestic stand-off by Russia into an 
international symbol of autonomy and defiance, a signal to the West that Russia will not 
bow to western pressure; and extrapolations from western behaviour in Bosnia as a 
deflected sign of intentions and perceptions of Russia as a player in international affairs; 
etc. This is a question of reflexive interpretation rather than a decoding of a set of givens 
that logically demands a particular course of action. 
3. The third perspective is that although the western Other is a volatile concept in and 
for Russian identity constructions, it does not, even in its most accommodating European 
manifestations, approach the imagery and cohesive implications of a European 'we' that 
have been prevalent within western Europe/the EU for the last decade; nor is it very likely 
that surveys trying to chart the strength of 'European identity' in Russia would replicate the 
results by Eurobarometer m Eastern Europe in 1991 (no.36), indicating that at least some 
would-be ECIEU member-states (notably Romania and Albania) were more 'European' 
than even the most committed nation-states within the Community. In Russia, 'Europe' 
may be a positive symbol, but it is a symbol of Otherness. In that capacity, it may signify -
as a cultural vehicle - features that Russians of different hue would like to claim for 
themselves. But the relation is still basically a binary one, whereas 'European identity' 
(notwithstanding its discursive-symbolic core) lays claim to a unity of both purpose and 
meaning (Hedetoft, 1996). 
The meaning of 'Europe' for Russianness, on the other hand, is - 'at best' - a token of 
good intent and a passport to international recognition; basically the import of the 
'Common European House', in most variants, is noncommittal. It is an indication of the 
ambivalence of Russian perceptions of the western Other that culturally positive notions of 
Europe find little political-economic echo in desires to join the EU;4 whereas culturally 
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acerbic perceptions of the USA are matched by a noticeable zeal, in some quarters, to 
become a member of NATO (and, if that cannot be, at least to keep the states within their 
eastern European secmity cushion from joining too). Again a distinction between the 
'West' at large and 'Europe': Russian relations to the USA are characterised by love and/or 
hate, those with Europe by symbolic gesturing. The modalities within which this takes 
place vmy quite a lot, however, as we shall see now, turning our attention to the current 
political landscape of Russian identity, Europe, and foreign policy conceptions. 
3. Strands and motivations ofidentity formulation in Russia 
This section attempts to flesh out some of the shaping forces within the political debate 
about the 'new' Russian nation, a necessary exercise, based on the assumption that Russian 
political identity needs to be analysed to make inferences about foreign policy behaviour. 
The question of identity and the national interests of Russia has produced a wide array 
of foreign policy conceptualisations. The discourse encompasses from the full 
intellectual spectrum as, for example, the political and cultural sciences, philosophy 
and history, as well as statements from public figures, all of which cannot always be 
clearly linked with specific political parties. 
At this point it needs noting that the Russian political set-up exhibits a week 
amorphous party structure, 'at the very beginning of a learning process' (Lester, 
1995:52). Rather than aggregating and mobilising interests, or as actors to provide a 
mechanism for access to and to control the state's power structure as a whole, Russian 
political parties are primarily elitist, lack organisational structure, and are essentially 
personality based. 
Hence the search for 'strands' is not an easy task but mirrors the complexity of 
identity search: national democratic tendencies might be coexistent with national 
communist and democratic integrative and nationalistic imperial formulations. In this 
perspective it appears that the Russian search or formulation of identity is closely 
interlinked with the search the 'Other' which is equally reflected in various foreign 
policy formulations. One trend which seems to be consistent is that the debate about 
Russia since 1991 has shifted from the stress on 'inclusion' (i.e. 'we' are part of the 
international community, civilisation, see also above), to one of 'uniqueness' 
(Achkasov, in Herrberg, 1995). For instance, almost all party blocs in the State Duma 
elections of 1995 appealed to a certain angle of a patriotic Russian feeling. 
The unpredictability of such changes is based on the dichotomies which dominate the 
search for the Russian 'self', as highlighted in the previous section. The following quote 
addresses the continuity of the historical legacy in this search: 
'Russia is the Christian East, which for two centuries was subject to the powerful 
influences of the West and whose cultured classes ..... assimilat[ed] Western ideas and 
doctrines, and [gave] them original form. But the assimilation of Western ideas and 
doctrines by the Russian intelligentsia was for most part a matter of dogma What 
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was scientific theol)' in the West, a hypothesis, or in any case a relative truth, partial, 
making no claim to be universal, became among the Russian intelligentisa a dogma, a 
sort of religious revelation' (Berdayev, 1960:21). 
At the same time it should not be forgotten, that the Russian emergence as the heir, de 
facto and de jure, to the former Soviet Union appears to have given rise to expectations 
from the West which, in tum, also has a decisive impact on the self-identification of the 
new Russian nation-state. Seen from the perspective of the Other (Europe and the West at 
large), it appears that the formulation of Russia's national identity has also been measured 
against the success of reform and democratic transition in the East and Central European 
states. Such expectations could give rise to problems because the Visigrad countries, with 
their aspirations for membership of the EU and NATO and their smaller and more 
manageable size, soon appeared to have an identity formation which defined itself closely 
with the European Union - albeit in a pragmatic sense (Herrberg and Moxon Browne, 
1995), and where civic values were (successfully) developed from below, in parallel to the 
decay of the authoritarian Communist structure. In addition, the pro-western attitude 
promulgated by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 1991 under the Yeltsin leadership, led the 
West to expect that the Russian Federation was going to integrate as a peaceful partuer in 
the international system. This was, as we know now, a premature conclusion. 
From a more endogenous perspective, Russia's search for identity and its 
corresponding formulations were, as should be expected, already ambiguous during 
Perestroika. Yeltsin's reinstatement of the Russian idea, involving a switch from its 
imperial identity, defined the parameters of the discourse of who 'we' are· While the ethnic 
and geographical elements did prevent a clear orientation towards a European identity, the 
identity debate nevertheless integrated 'Europe' as a cultural notion (denoting, as indicated, 
the wish to return to civilisation), whereas the 'West' is considered as the signpost of 
distinct 'Otherness' . Groups or political parties employing this 'European' rhetoric in their 
discourse use it in conjunction with a pragmatic orientation, while those who use the West 
as Other in their definition of identity tend to display a stronger nationalist tinge. 
1. The initially heavily vocalised Atlanticist orientation, here termed the pro-
Western Group, expresses itself through a Russian European identity, taking a pro-
American and European attitude. In contrast to the 'Westerners' in the framework of 
tsarist autocracy, who limited their aims to a sectoral modernisation while maintaining 
the old 'regime', this strand closely interrelates the change of the system with 
integration in a western community of values and strives towards a political and 
economic union with the west (Weiss, 1995). Russia has missed the mainstream of 
progressive civilisation because it refused to follow the Western cultural path: The 
Russian path is a 'cul de sac' (Lester, 1995). Its initial heavy emphasis towards 
economic determinism and universal democratic values, was a movement strongly 
supported by foreign minister Kozyrev, with the backing of Boris Yeltsin. This group, 
mostly represented by the political factions of Democratic Choice Russia (Gaidar), and the 
1993 Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (Sobchak), as well as, to some exten~ 
Our Home Russia (Chernomyrdin), defies easy categorisation. 
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In Gregor Gaidar's book Decision in Russia, the opening of Russia's encrusted power 
structw"es is strongly advocated, and this opening should be towards the West, 'without 
officially accepted xenophobia, without the active creation of "foe" images - both internal 
and extemaI' (Gaidar, 1995). On the other hand, the Russian choice movement, in the 
1993 elections, put out a programme that focused on sentimental values of identity 
formulation based on the ethnic-cultural variables (Endo). 
On the whole, however, it appears that this grouping is embracing a conciliatoI)' 
foreign policy formulation and a very open dialogne with the West, while inquiring how 
the new Russia could be accommodated into the existing multilateral frameworks in 
Europe. The most urgent goal of this group has also been successful integration into the 
westem system. Due to the complex economic problems, the inflexibility of the inherited 
state apparatus, and the critical attitude of the western nations regarding speedy integration, 
this group has not managed to push through its interests and make them acceptable to a 
wider public. The involvement with a countI)' which is hard to understand and even harder 
to predict caused a long reaction lag of the European Union (Arbatov, 1994). Kozyrev's 
intervention, pleading for a politics of 'inclusion' by advocating not only membership of 
the European Union, but also of NATO, created a great sense of distrust among the 
electorate when it appeared that this inclusion was not automatic, if possible at all. It is for 
this reason that the advocating of 'open relations' has become the major issue of contention 
around which the Russian identity formulations of both East and West clash. At a time 
when this group had a stronghold, the 'Atlanticists' found their support among all levels of 
the elite: in the communist party, the intelligentsia, and the mass media. Increasingly, this 
unequivocal support for an immediate opening towards the West, resulting in a so called 
'Revolutions of Expectations' resulting from the promise of parallel reform, however, 
began to evoke opposition from other levels of society: The shock therapy induced by the 
backlash to this pro-western attitude gave rise to the first moves towards nationalist 
thinking and slogans. The IMF credits that were given generously, but on the u.s. insisten-
ce that Russia need to be barred from the international arms market, created the impression 
that Russia had put itself at the mercy of the Other. It is now evident that the substitution of 
a system of traditional values with universal values from above was a failure. As a result, 
ideas of 'uniqueness' are raised again, and it appears now that this groups reverts to initial 
formulations of self-identification around the left on the continuum. 
2. The Moderate Liberal Group, which ranges from Yavlinsky Bloc (i.e.Yavlinsky, 
Vladimir Lukin), the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (i.e. Stankevich) to the more 
endo-exo Democratic Party of Russia (Glas'ev), approaches Europe with a post-imperialist 
attitude. While on the one hand this groups refuses to accept a Russian quest for 
expansionism and opposes an isolationist stance for Russia, it does, on the other, reproach 
the West for a lack of objectivity in its perception of Russia. The interdependency and 
intertwining of diverse cultures has been seen as a key asset for a strong Russia. Hence, the 
(multipolar) relationship of Russia and western Europe is seen as a strength and as a 
harbinger of a 'world super coalition'. The process of integration in the European Union, 
however, foreshadowing a Political Union, is seen as a development that reinforces its role 
as Other, and is therefore not desirable (Lukin, 1994). Kozyrev's foreign policy is 
criticised. 'Presently, Russia is busy with itself. [ ... J the countI)"s intemaI plights are 
worsened by an incompetent foreign policy'. (SpiegeL 1995:186). Based on the 'Russian 
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idea' as a Russian definition of a multi-ethnic, multinational idea the movement 
concentrates on ethnic variety and relations to its neighboming states. The focus .remains 
on cultures, which, according to the supporters of this group, cannot and should not be 
isolated from each other (pomeranc, 1990:208; Kurockina, 1990:215-217). 
On the question of national statehood (gosudarstvennost), the line of thought departs 
from the ethnic determination of identity. As Lukin writes, '(c)omplete ethnic self-
determination would lead directly to the dissolution of Russia into smaller and smaller 
pieces isolated from one another. ( ... ) The strengthening of unity and territorial integrity is, 
in my opinion, another fimdamental "national interest' of Russia; it is a necessary 
condition for national democratic development' (Lukin, 1994:107-108). YavIinsky sees a 
policy of European multilateral integration (for Nato and EO) as improbable: therefore, 
focus should be put on a good neighbourly relationship (Schneider, 1995). The orientation 
towards an endo/exo image sees the Russian idea as embedded in a worldly, Europe-
friendly context, and as a way to widen its own horizons and adapt to the moral values of 
the West The importance of democracy, freedom, tolerance, plmaIism, and the 
preservation of individualism and individual rights fDIm the basis of this argument. A 
consistent claim by the Moderate Liberal group is that Russia should abandon it status as a 
beggar knocking at the door of the European home, because it will not receive a fair deal 
and will always have to make too many concessions. This should be avoided by 
restructming the economy by its own means, with no western aid, in order to develop a 
national security policy in its own right. The communist influenced and social democratic 
orientations which feed into this strand as, for example the Russian Party of Social 
Democracy (Lipitslci), while opposing certain Western values (such as consumer societies), 
shows a pragmatic and programmatic self confidence towards the Other. Thus, in many 
ways the Moderate Liberals appear to shape their outlook on pragmatism, whilst showing 
most allegiance to a distinct Russian-European identity legacy as a way to promote its own 
modernised identity in the 90s. 
3. Growing social unrest in the Ukraine and the sudden realisation of a 'Phantom 
pain' as a way of referring to the newly-won independence of the fonner provinces of the 
USSR, gave Russia an impetus to consolidate its interests in order to remain a powerful 
centre of the CIS. The Centrist Group, conservative, has argued consistently for better 
relations with the West, but not at the cost of diminishing Russia in its sphere of influence. 
The concept of the unique Russian idea, as expressed in the ownership of a national 
Russian culture and civilisation, disregarding multiethnic reality, puts national unity as its 
priority. The strength of the Russian civil society lies in the communitarian tradition of 
Gemeinschaji, (rather than a Gesellschaji based on more individualist self-assertion). This 
faction, supported by the predominant part of the military command, industrial managers, 
and the main segments of the federal bureaucracy, advocates the preservation of Russia's 
military power, which is deemed an essential part of the new Russia The Centrist group is 
a movement rooted in contemporary age (Lester, 1995), leaning on the volatile currents of 
public opinion, which creates the problem of positioning itself in the political spectrum. 
Associated with this group are Our Home Russia (Chemomyrdin), the Democratic Party of 
Russia (Travkin) and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Shakrai) and in it moderate 
fonn (closely bordering on the Eurasionist camp) the Derzhava (Rutskoi) as well as the 
Workers Party (Fyodorov). This group defines itself against the West as Other. Hence, 
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some supporters of the group argue against an over-reliance on western economic 
assistance, most notably the IMF and the World Bank, since it is seen as an interventionist 
force in domestic affairs. Especially Our Home Russia gives priority to regaining 
sUpeIpOwer status, criticising pro-western foreign policy. Moving to the left-hand side of 
the continumn, this faction sees cooperation with China, India, and Iran as a useful tool for 
becoming a powerful Other vis-a.-vis the West, while warning against the perils of Islamic 
fundamentalism Protection of Russian interests against NATO expansion could be 
effectively counteracted by collective defence alliances, which would however, not be anti-
western. 
The Russian state clearly underestimated the effects of the loss of its Soviet legacy. 
To offset this, it formulated a stronger foreigu policy agenda aiming towards the 
(re)integration of the 'near abroad' and coinciding with reinforced suspicion of the West. 
Putting it differently, Russia, feeling the rug slipping away from under its feet, rather than 
gaining authority over itself; chose a reactive/compensatory tack primarily indicative of its 
difficulties with its loss of imperial authority, and sparlcing off an ambiguous foreign 
policy. 
4. The rise of the extreme right or the 'Eurasionists' or 'Russophiles' has become a 
major source of debate both in the East and West. Here the 'Russian idea' is extended to 
the Euro-Asiatic Area, the territory of the former Soviet Union, thereby inteIpreting on the 
basis of a multiethnic and multicultural history. As an independent culture and civiIisation 
between Asia and Europe, this orientation provides integrative (and disintegrative) 
orientations, but also, which gives rise to concern to Western observers, clearly denies a 
Islamic or European Identity or decentraIisation of the former USSR as a result of 
increased nationalism in the Eurasion area The Nationalist groups, a faction chiefly 
represented by the Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky), the Communist Party 
(Zyuganov) but also to some extent the Agrarian Party (Lapshin), Dignity and Charity, 
and the Constructive EcolOgical Movement of Russia, see Russia as a special entity 
between the North Atlantic and Pacific Asia. The demarcation line towards other parties is 
that rather than integrating itself into an international political structure which is not in 
Russia's interest, it should seek to integrate others. In relation to the exogenous world, 
Russia sees itself as a superpower, and therefore the Soviet republics should be considered 
and promoted as part of the Russian sphere of influence. Russia should neither join the 
European Union, nor the European Council, but (according to Zhirinovsky) aim towards a 
new defence alliance between Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia 
and Slovakia. Gaining political power by taking advantage of President Yeltsin's domestic 
failures and foreign policy weaknesses, this group defines itself by promoting the 'Russian 
idea', a school of thought which came into being in the 19th century and now is 
discursively used as a signpost pointing towards the basic values by which the Russian 
people have allowed to themselves to be guided throughout a large part of their history. 
This faction feeds on a fundamental anti-Americanism which formerly was integrated into 
the ideology of the Soviet Union. The antipathy against the USA, or the West, is based on 
the belief that American traditions are not sacred, nor do they represent civilisation, but 
rather oppress others (including Europe) with a somewhat anti-ethical, anti-traditional, 
'babylonic' model (Den, 1992). As such, the Eurasionists see their task in the defence of 
Russia's own identity against an irrationally transplanted American culture. 
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These right-wing nationalists envision imperial geopolitical projects in which Emope, as 
part of a new Russia, plays an active role. The debate ponders the creation of a 'Euro-
Soviet Imperial Counny, from Vladivostok to Dublin', an axis ranging throughout Russia, 
Germany, and China. An interesting aspect is how the Eurasionists see Emope as a 
civilised region and as such as a potential ally of Russia's, since Russia's traditional cultures 
are not mature enough to be used as a stable basis to sln"vive on its own. 
4. The triangular dynamic 
In light of these changes a Civic Union will have great difficulties in restructuring and 
shaping a distinct identity 'top-down'. Its momentum of unpredictability will tend to 
increase rather than abate. Nevertheless, it seems to be a current tendency in the majority 
of significant political and intellectual groups that they have come to realise that Russian 
imitation of a western model of democracy and identity will not be the key to the door of 
civilisation, but, rather, that identity needs to be found from within and will need to be 
(re)structured according to Russia's own distinct cultme and traditions. On the other hand, 
nostalgic metoric promoting escape into an illusOIY 'Golden Age' is no longer perceived as 
a serious option either. This 'endo-exo' tension, having an overall orientation towards 
'interests' and 'context', has led to legitimising the reintegration of the CIS as a strategy for 
reassembling the Russian Empire and to promoting this strategy as one solution to the 
identity problem. 
Premature conclusions are easily made, the complexity of the debate, however, 
indicates that its volatility, feeding at some stages a political opportunism, does not indicate 
that expansionism is a projection of internal despotism and that the internal momentum is 
being fostered by a messianic mge stemming from Tsarist (religious) and Communist 
(ideological) sentiments. Yegor Gaidar's reformist moves have been instrumental in 
shaping a new liberal-democratic image, moderate enough to be tolerated by the West and 
also to be condoned by domestic politics.5 The move towards this model marks a tum 
away from the Atlanticist model. Yeltsin's appearance in the 'near abroad' and also his 
strengthening of relations with China are an indication of this. 
This argument finds further support in the emergence of a new foreign policy 
doctrine in 1993, a product of the Foreign Ministry, the security council, and the two 
committees of the Supreme Soviet, as well as other influential experts. Its formulation 
demonstrates the re-emergence of a political will to vocalise a strong Russian statehood in 
tandem with a strong nationally oriented policy. This is to some extent also evident in the 
concept paper 'Strategy for Russia', published by the non-governmental 'Council for 
Foreign and Defence Policy' in March 1994. This influential paper affirms on the one hand 
that Russian/western differences are so great that Russia must pursue a policy of 
'balancing' between the 'centres of power' whilst on the other participating in a new 
collective security system in Emope (Krause and Jahr, 1995: 16). 
The change was further demonstrated by the fact that the new focus in foreign policy 
brought it closer to the policy line of the former Soviet Union, putting less emphasis on 
integration into an international community of democratic nation-states (ibid). In this 
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scenario, cooperation with the West is only desirable when and in so far as it adds to 
Russia's internal stability, and only as long as it contributes to and is functional in securing 
western understanding for Russia's legitimate interests. The eve of the Balkan crisis in 
1993, in which Russia reasserted itself as an Other by recognising its historical ties with 
Serbs, is a prime example of this urge towards endogenous self-definition and 
independence of action. 
Karaganov, organiser of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, has for this 
reason argued that the only way to become a modern state is live through a period of 
increased nationalism and statism (Karaganov, 1991). This increased nationalism, he 
argues, is necessary in order to resurrect a countIy so badly mauled by totalitarianism and 
mismanagement While this is undoubtedly a threat against maintaining a dialogue with 
Europe and the West, it appears that the developments such statements reflect are grossly 
misinteIpreted and badly understood outside Russia. 
When Yeltsin in 1991 developed a strategy towards the West, he outlined two 
goals: first to pave a way for a civilised state community and to support it by maximal 
support from the outside. This romantic period began to come to a close when in October 
1993, Andrey Kozyrev insisted that partnership never meant 'unity' and accordingly this 
partnership ought to be based on 'realism and the mutual overcoming of difficulties'. The 
statement matches the fact that the initial strategy of 'Atlanticism', having ended in a 'blind 
alley' (Krause and Jahr, 1995), is now being discursivised as a special agenda in 
International Relations (i.e. a Russian Sonderweg). The claim that the West has failed to 
read the 'signs' of peaceful cooperation, as evidenced by its cautious approach, has 
conversely been misread by Russia as a Western conspiracy aiming towards weakening its 
state. Furthermore, the 'outright' rejection, by the West, of transforming the OSCE into the 
main coordinating institution for European security6 - a countermove against enlarging 
NATO along a western model, marks the retmn to a 'cold peace' rather than the coopera-
tive and peaceful relationship that the international community expected. To put in 
somewhat more crude terms 'Those who insist that NATO should enlarge are 
committing a grave political error. The flames of war could extend over the whole of 
Europe' (Yeltsin, quoted in Agence Europe 9/9/1995). 
This, in a kind of vicious-circle dynamic, shapes the Russian Federation increasingly 
as the powerful Other, creating new enemy images in the international community. In tmn 
it entails that Russia, feeling cornered, feels forced to define itself against the West. The 
division of the general electorate on almost all policy issues, and the dissatisfaction of 
having lost status in the near and far abroad, lead to growing opposition on the part of a 
general public increasingly visualising the West as an opponent or at least a competitor, 
and feed strong nationalistic movements (including movements for national-regional 
separatism) as often encapsulated in the catchword 'Eurasia'. 
The security issue will ultimately be the most important one as regards Russia's 
relation to the Other. Here, NATO has crystallised as a core institution that all actors are 
locked into. While the basic premise of NATO is changing, and its institutional 
infrastructure is becoming more closely interlinked with the European Union, so, too, does 
Europe become more closely associated with the West, blurring a distinction traditionally 
made by the Russians. The progressive disintegration of Russia puts the European security 
architecture under ever more powerful strain, while the West is under pressure to provide 
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security guarantees to the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic States. The creation of 
this pull-effect implies a further exclusion of Russia from Europe. 
Another option for Russia is to attach its national interests to the East European 
States. Also here, however, Russia finds itself in a dilemma. The movement towards future 
NATO and EU membership on the part of the former satellite states has limited Russia's 
room for manoeuvre, but has also increased the need to continue bilateral dialogue with 
these countries in an effort to further its own national interests in the West, whilst 
simultaneously demanding a formulation of a Russian identity distinct from the East and 
Central European States. Interesting enough, the European Union negotiated its Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement with Russia at the same time that European enlargement in the 
Korfu summit (June 1994) towards the East was negotiated, which appeared to give equal 
importance and therefore avoided a further 'exclusion clash'. 
The regional security arrangements will be difficult to resolve in the future. Russia 
has an interest in cooperating with its former satellites on economic terms. A policy of 
'Russia first' towards the East European states, advocated by the Eurasionists and heatedly 
discussed in the Russian press, might not be very realistic: yet the hardening of the borders 
in both security and economic terms will also harden the Russian attitude towards these 
regional arrangements. It is for this reason that Russia will always oppose a transformation 
of these states into a cordon sanitaire for NATO. As Pravda argues, '(i)n post-Soviet 
conditions Eastem Europe may have lost much of its old significance as an area for the 
projection of Russian influence; [but] it still retains its importance as a point of Russian 
access to developed Europe' (Pravda, 1992: 147). 
Thus on the one hand a tendency is visible for a return to the left-hand side of the 
continuum (formulation of interest and identity based on sentiment), but there seems to be 
also, on the other, a parallel move towards more pragmatism in the international context. 
The combination of such forces demonstrates that the blurring of the interest formulations 
of these groups creates a zone of uncertainty and volatility between the left- and the right-
hand sides of the continuum. In this sense, the new three-pronged approach, revolving 
around enlargement or hegemonic interests (endo), the search for new allies in Asia and the 
world at large (endo-exo), and the return to traditional spheres of influences (endo), overall 
indicates a perceptible shift towards the left-hand side of the continuum. 
While this might be the option followed by Moscow, the shift would simultaneously 
create unrest and discomfort among the 'new Russian' community, which includes a 
powerful business elite, which has considerable political leverage in Russian modern 
politics. The problem is undoubtedly that the Russian political elite is partly interested in a 
European order in which Russia could continue to playa dominant role, while on the other 
hand it is ignoring the basic changes and the economic integration that have taken place 
internationally. The attempt to conceptualise international affairs on the basis of a 
traditional state centred modeL while ignoring transnational factors, risks excluding Russia 
from the advantages of not only the economic integration processes in Europe (EU), but 
also America (NAFfA), and the Asian Pacific Region (APEC). 
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5. Responses from the European Union 
The uncertainty of Russia's future presents the European Union with difficulties in shaping 
a response. As with other actors, the European Union has been vague in formulating a long 
term strategy, having initially focused on short term results of its relationship with Russia 
However, there is also some truth in the statement that the 'EU is Russia's most important 
partner' as proclaimed by Yeltsin in 1993. In economic terms, Russia has a 3.3 billion 
ECU trade surplus with the European Union. In political tenns the European Union has 
established a formal dialogue? It is noteworthy that in the drawing up a Communication of 
the Council regarding its relationship with Russia, the Commission has for the first time 
made use of the right of initiative it holds with Member States in the field of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, under Article 18 of the Treaty of the European Union. In 
response, the European Council of Cannes confirmed the importance it attached to 
developing the EU's relations as key element to the EU's relationship with Russia 
because it is 'essential for the stability of the European continent', and it also reiterated 
the will of the EU to establish a 'substantial relationship of partnership' with Russia. 
In order to enter and establish such a relationship however, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that the formulation of long term goals requires a deeper understanding of Russia 
today. The consolidation of short and long term goals clearly requires a set of theories of 
system transformation and nation-building rather than a static identification of 
interrelationships (Breslauer, 1995). 
The discussions about the ratification and signing of the 'Partnership and Co-
operation Agreemenf provide an example of these difficulties. It might be for this reason 
that the Communication of the Commission stresses the importance of creating an identity 
for the Russian state, whilst taking 'greater account of the specificities of the EUlRussian 
relationship' (p. 5), accompanied by an assurance that increased attention will be paid to 
political issues in Russia pertaining to relations with the European Union. 
Even if the EU has managed to entertain a constructive dialogue with the Russian 
Federation, it lacks the power in displaying political muscle, and will seek to strengthen 
bilateral relationships with member states of the EU. But it should be recognised that for 
some time, the European Union has promoted an intensification of the dialogue between 
Russia and NATO, of the Partnership for Peace, a strengthening of the NACC and of the 
OSCE in its role as a coordinating institution for a peaceful relationship between the East 
and the West The efforts to strengthen the relationship between the Russian Federation 
and the WEU, and the inclusion of a mechanism that allows for an ad hoc dialogue on 
Common Positions (Section 11, 1), represent a clear effort to assume an independent role as 
a political actor. 
For Russia, the EU plays an important geopolitical role, in the primary sense that it 
provides a counterweight to the USA. Also, the EU will continue to receive much attention 
as a way to approach and get goodwill from individual member states. Chancellor Kohl's 
words, 'the most stupid thing' that Western policy could do is 'to disregard the pride of the 
Russians' (Der SpiegeL 1995), do have their validity here. 
It appears, though that both the European Union and Russia have a long road to go. 
The former because it is in reality unable to transform its good intentions into a solid 
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political proactive policy, the latter because it needs to build confidence from within and 
promote a two way relationship between its civic society and the government. Europe and 
the European Union's role is to inter alia to help the Russian Other in its process of self-
identification, but also in answering the questions of what Russia represents, but also what 
Europe should represent for Russia, in this way creating clearly identifiable Others 
themselves. 
The Cold War is over: and the institutions which were once created in response to the 
USSR should begin to outgrow their enemy roles. What needs to be reiterated is that it was 
a consensus in Russia which advocated both a return to civilised statehood with 
constitutional democracy (however interpreted), a market economy, and a legal order. This 
choice, welcomed by so many, has proven to have painful consequences. 
Parallel to this, it needs to be realised that the process of nation building and identity 
formation goes hand in hand with the process of state building. The aim towards a 
comprehensive and cohesive response needs to avoid an overestimation of one process at 
the expense of the other. 
In light of the apparent hardening of fronts, the European Union can benefit from a 
comprehensive proactive, pragmatic approach, so it will be better equipped to identify 
where the Russian national interest lies, and how it can be more realistically responded to. 
The building of any nation-state requires a definition of the national political community 
that differentiates it from other communities. Russia has always proclaimed its place in 
Europe, and even though it might not share a European political identity in terms of formal 
institutions, it nevertheless forms - and sees itself as forming, also at the 'endo' end of the 
continuum - an integral part of the cultural identity of Europe. Thus, Russia cannot and 
should not be disregarded or underestimated by either the European Union ex or inclusive 
its Eastern European satellites. 
At the time of writing, Russia has entered the Council of Europe on the express 
recommendation of the European Union, signifying peIhaps an avenue towards a general 
policy of inclusion. It is clear that this type of inclusion bears both responsibilities and 
possibilities to the successor ofKozyrev, the more Centrist foreign minister, Primakov. But 
it is also obvious that any constructive interaction between the EU and Russia in the future 
must be based on a mutual recognition and appraisals of the Other that are liberated from 
the emotional and rigid stereotypes of the Cold War. 
6. Conclusions 
The argument of this article can briefly be condensed into the following five points. 
1. The forging of a Russian political identity after the collapse of the USSR is both 
one of the most significant processes at work in Russia today and simultaneously one of 
the most difficult, due to a number of historical, geopolitical, and cultural dichotomies that 
have shaped the political culture of Russia. 
2. One of the most important of these dichotomies pertains to the role of the western 
Other, which in turn subdivides into 'Europe' (as an image of culturaVcosmopolitan 
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contiguity) and the West' (Adanticism and the USA, representing political-military 
contrast, but also frequendy a model to be grudgingly emulated). This particular reflexivity 
is all-important for the identity processes going on today, both because it touches on 
Russia's possibilities for inclusion into or exclusion from the international community, and 
because it impinges on Russia's possibilities for attaining self-respect, autonomy, and stable 
security arrangements. 
3. We argue that this problematique can methodologically be conceptuaIised by using 
a continuum model stretching from endogenous to exogenous perceptions of Russianness 
and a triangular model defining shifting relations between interests, identity, and context. 
We argue that although most signs indicate that the political consensus in Russia is moving 
towards endogenous formulations (entailing an emphasis on identity, culture, and 
ethnicity), this is not happening without a certain contradictoriness, since at the same time 
ever-more attention is being paid to political interests, including the international context. 
TIlls leaves some room for doubts and uncertainties, but also for exogenous actors like the 
EU to impact the process. 
4. In terms of political formulation., Russia seems to have embarked on a relatively 
new three-pronged approach following a number of abortive and/or humiIiating approaches 
to the West immediately after 1990/91: using the CIS as a pivotal centre for enlarging and 
strengthening the Russian sphere of influence; searching for new allies in the near abroad 
(e.g. China); and returning to traditional strategies of power balancing by using old allies 
and spheres of influence (e.g. Serbia, East and Central Europe). Increasingly, Russia is 
attempting to formulate both its identity and its policies independendy of the West. 
5. The EU has followed a vacillating course vis-it-vis Russia. Seen from Russia's 
point of view, the line between 'cultural Europe' and 'political Adanticism' is becoming 
blurred. However, there is still a pervasive interest within Russia in maintaining good 
relations with Europe, based on the cultural-historical legacy, and predicated on Russia still 
perceiving itself to be somehow part of Europe. It is fraught with great risks for both 
Europe and the international community not to realise the importance, but also the nature 
and dynamics, of the current struggle between pro-Europeans and Eurasionists in the 
Russian political landscape. An understanding for the need for Russia to regain self-respect 
and international recognition is a sine qua non, without depicting such an endeavour as 
necessarily antagonistic to western interests. Paradoxically, therefore, both 'Europe' and 
'the West: have an important contribution to make towards the Russian self-definition of its 
identity, purpose, and future. The basic reflexivity and fluidity of such processes must be 
recognised and acted on., in the self-interest of western nation-states and the functionality 
of international institutions. 
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Notes 
J. As for our use of 'identity', this article deals primarily with national-identity formulations 'top-doMl', i.e. those 
di.scumveIy and practically in evidence amongst the makers and ideologues or present.<Jay RussiaDress (political 
actors, intellectualls,media personalities), and less with the forms and substances of Russian identity as a cohesive set 
of values and affuctive inclinations amongst the Russian people at large. Thus, we address the area of politics and that 
of the political culture of Russia as they impinge on the debates and conslIUclions of a national political identity. 
However, since such endeavours and their manifeslalions both directly and increasingly involve the people as the 
addresses of political P"P'ganda, and build on reinventions ofhistoricaI identity components of a cultwal and popuIar 
nature, 'political identity' as a key concept does appropriate cultwaliXJPUlar substances and is reflexively 
codetermined by elite pera:ptions of what the people think and feel, and what e.g. politicians therefore have to 
embrnce if they wish to be elected, be popular, stay in power etc. For this reason, historical and contemporary 
underpinnings of Russian identity as a horizontal irnaginerl community from below will occasionaJJy di.en.,...., 
2 Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the International Security and Arms Control S1Jb.Committee, State Duma of 
the Russian Federation, in Special Report to NATO's International Secretarial, Novemher 1994, pp. 3-4. 
3 This increasing affectiveness of political discourse is due to the relations between politics and the electorate 
addressed in note I above. 
, This does not mean that Russia is not interested in good trade relations with Europe, only that this interest 
rarely translates into ambitions of economic-political integration. 
5 Though not wholeheartedly by the electorate, witness the defeat in September 1995 of Chemomyrdin's (and 
Yeltsin's) top-down party construction, 'Our Home Russia' , in Yekatarinburg. This indicates a deep-seated 
scepticism of the Moscow power-holders and a gmwing rift between official politics and popnlar attitudes. 
6 That is to say in conventional security issues. The OSCE has become an important Pan European institution 
coordinating security issues concerning migration, minorities issues and refugee questions. This organisation 
has become, for example the coordinating institution (with the ED) to monitor the Russian elections 
, For example, the European Union President of the Council and the Commission meet on a bi-yearly hasis 
with the President of the Russian Federation, where they discuss both economic and political issues. 
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